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ON A CONSTITUTIONAL COLLISION
COURSE: ATTORNEY NO-COMMENT
RULES AND THE RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO INFORMATION*
I. INTRODUCTION
Attorney Dominic Gentile knew he represented an innocent
man.' A local grand jury had indicted Grady Sanders, charging him
with stealing money and drugs from his clients' safe deposit vaults. 2
To counter the pervasive and prejudicial pretrial publicity surround-
ing the case, Gentile held a press conference following Sanders' ar-
raignment.3 At the conference, Gentile announced his client's
innocence and discussed his theory of the case, noting publicly that
he was bound by disciplinary rules that limited the subject matter on
which he could elaborate. 4 Though a jury ultimately acquitted his
client, Gentile faced a private reprimand from the Southern Nevada
Disciplinary Board and the Nevada Supreme Court, which affirmed
that he violated the local attorney no-comment rules.5
Attorney no-comment rules are designed to regulate trial pub-
licity in order to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. They pro-
hibit lawyers from commenting about pending criminal cases if they
have reason to believe their statements will have a "substantial like-
lihood of materially prejudicing" an adjudicative proceeding.6
Following the Nevada Supreme Court's decision to reprimand
Gentile for violating the local attorney no-comment rules, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the stan-
dard that should govern attorney speech.7 In Gentile v. State Bar of
* I would like to thank Jack C. Doppelt for his knowledge and creativity in helping
me develop this piece and reviewing earlier drafts of this article. I also want to thank
Dominic Gentile for his help and insight.
I "I can't fill a hand with people that I've represented that were truly innocent.
Grady was one of them .... Joint Appendix at 42, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111
S. Ct. 2720 (1991) (No. 89-1836) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
2 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2728 (1991).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 2731-32.
5 Id. at 2723.
6 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1983).
7 Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2738.
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Nevada, the Court said that states could regulate lawyers' speech in
order to preserve a defendant's right to a fair trial.8 In Gentile's
case, however, Nevada's rules proved too vague to provide mean-
ingful guidelines.9 By approving restrictions on lawyers' speech
outside the courtroom, the Court failed to reconcile a series of ac-
cess-to-information cases 10 that allow the public and press access to
courtroom proceedings. In these open court proceedings, the pub-
lic gains access to the same information prohibited by attorney no-
comment rules. As a result, attorney no-comment rules do not ac-
complish their purpose of shielding prejudicial information from
potential jurors; instead, they merely postpone dissemination of the
very same information until it is raised in the courtroom setting."
Furthermore, these rules infringe upon attorneys' freedom of
speech, as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion. In light of the rules' ineffectiveness in protecting the overrid-
ing interest of a defendant's right to a fair trial, this Comment
argues that the First Amendment restraint on free speech is unjusti-
fied and therefore unconstitutional.
Part II of this article traces the history of attorney no-comment
rules from their inception as recommendations designed for heavily
publicized cases to their present form as American Bar Association
Model Rule 3.6.12 Part III reviews the five Supreme Court access-
to-information cases' 3 that allow the public and media access to trial
court proceedings and the subsequent right to publish information
resulting from these proceedings. Part IV analyzes the Supreme
8 Id. at 2723-26.
9 Id. at 2731-32.
10 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501
(1984) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise I]; Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984); Press-Enter-
prise Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise II].
I1 Michael A. Swartz, Note, Trial Participant Speech Restrictions: Gagging First Amendment
Rights, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1411, 1432 (1990).
While this Comment does not address whether pretrial publicity does, in fact, im-
pact jurors, empirical studies reveal that jury prejudice resulting from such press cover-
age is exaggerated. For a discussion of this subject, see Ralph Frasca, Estimating the
occurrence of trials prudiced by press coverage, 72 JUDICATURE 162 (1988); Robert Drechsel,
An Alternative View of Media-Judiciary Relations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests about the
Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18 HOFSTR.A L. REV. 1 (1989); ALFRED FRIENDLY & RONALD L.
GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY (1967); Rita J. Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Ne-
braska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact ofJurors of News Coverage?, 29
STAN. L. REV. 515 (1977); Don R. Pember, Does Pretrial Publicity Really Hurt?, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. 16 (Sept.-Oct. 1984); John M. Shipman, Jr. & Dale Spencer, Courts
Recognize Multiple Factors in Free Press/Fair Trial Cases, 12 COMM. & L. 87 (1990).
12 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1983).
13 Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. 539; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555; Press-Enterprise I,
464 U.S. 501; Waller, 467 U.S. 39; Press-Enterprise 1I, 478 U.S. 1.
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Court's decision in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada14 and the standard of
free speech that exists for lawyers. Part V juxtaposes pretrial court
proceedings and the information that arises within the course of
each of these hearings with restrictions imposed by attorney no-
comment rules. This contrast illustrates the ineffectiveness of these
rules in preventing public dissemination of information that is con-
sidered prejudicial. Part VI explores the effect of abolishing attor-
ney no-comment rules, positing that courts will be forced to re-
examine and scrutinize the issuance of gag orders on trial partici-
pants. This judicial review will ultimately result in the establishment
of a constitutional standard by trial courts that will regulate extraju-
dicial speech and provide a clear, unambiguous standard by which
trial participants can effectively gauge their comments.
II. THE HISTORY OF RULE 3.6
From 1961 to 1966, the United States Supreme Court reversed
four convictions as a result of prejudicial publicity that prevented
the defendant from receiving a fair trial. 15 In Sheppard v. Maxwell,I6
the Court criticized the trial court judge for failing to use available
mechanisms to mute the effect of publicity. It also noted that preju-
dicial press reports had become "increasingly prevalent," requiring
trial courts to take effective steps to ensure a fair and impartial trial
through jury sequestration, change of venue, or continuances.1 7
The Court warned:
[W]e must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in
those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its incep-
tion. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will
protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither
prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff
nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court
should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaborating between
counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a crim-
inal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and
14 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
15 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (carnival-like atmosphere and inflam-
matory publicity denied defendant a fair trial and due process); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532 (1965) (televised pretrial hearing and mass publicity throughout trial infringed on
defendant's right to a fair trial); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (denial of
venue change following broadcast of "interview," in which suspect confessed to crime
prior to arraignment, violated defendant's due process); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961) (massive publicity and police-issued press releases regarding defendant's confes-
sion made change of venue to adjoining county ineffective and denied defendant a fair
trial).
16 384 U.S. at 362.
17 Id. at 362-63.
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worthy of disciplinary measures.1
In response to this mandate, the American Bar Association
(ABA) appointed the Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free
Press to propose guidelines (hereinafter referred to as the Reardon
Report) that would prevent prejudicial publicity during criminal
proceedings.1 9 The committee stated that while freedom of speech
and freedom of the press should be "zealously preserved," these
rights should be balanced against their potential effect on other fun-
damental rights, such as the right to a fair and impartial trial.20
The Reardon Report recommended that attorneys be prohib-
ited from commenting about information regarding pending crimi-
nal litigation if a "reasonable likelihood" existed that the
dissemination of such information would interfere with a fair trial.
21
The report suggested that from the time of arrest or filing of an
indictment, information or complaint until the start of trial, prose-
cutors and defense lawyers should not make any extrajudicial state-
ments concerning the following subjects: the defendant's prior
criminal record, character, or reputation, except for factual data;22
the contents of any confession, admission, or statement by the de-
fendant or the refusal thereof; the performance of or refusal to per-
form any tests or examinations; the identity, testimony, or credibility
of any prospective witnesses; the possibility of a guilty plea or plea
bargain; and the suspect's guilt or innocence based on the evi-
dence.23 Information regarding the circumstances of the arrest,
seized evidence, judicial scheduling, or assistance needed for the in-
vestigation could be announced. 24 During the trial, lawyers could
only refer to or quote from information in public records. 25 While
the case was still pending in any court following trial or disposition,
attorneys were prohibited from making extrajudicial comments that
could reasonably prejudice sentencing.26
18 Id. at 363.
19 Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, ABA Project on Minimum Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press (Approved
Draft 1968) [hereinafter Reardon Report]. The committee was also formed in part due
to the Warren Commission, which reviewed the events surrounding Lee Harvey Os-
wald's death in 1964 and called for steps to create a proper balance between the public's
right to information and an individual's right to a fair trial. Id. at 19.
20 Reardon Report, supra note 19, at 16.
21 Id. at 82.
22 Such factual data included the name, age, residence, and any information neces-
sary for apprehension of the suspect. Id. at 83.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 83-84.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 84.
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In an effort to establish uniform federal and state standards, the
Committee on the Operation of the Jury System (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Kaufman Committee), echoed the recommendations
of the Reardon Report, relying on district courts to control the flow
of prejudicial publicity. 27 Recognizing that lawyers disseminated
most of the publicity in criminal cases, the committee advocated that
"each United States District Court has the power and the duty to
control the release of prejudicial information by attorneys who are
members of the bar of that court." 28 The committee also urged
courts to enforce violations with local disciplinary rules. 29
The Reardon Report guidelines, which were endorsed by the
Kaufman Committee, became the basis of Disciplinary Rule 7-107,3o
which outlined permissible and non-permissible comments that law-
yers could make to the media. The disciplinary rule became part of
the ABA's Model Code of Professional Conduct, which every state
27 Report on the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-
Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 407 (1968).
28 Id. at 401, 406.
29 Id. at 401.
30 Disciplinary Rule 7-107 states:
(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a criminal mat-
ter shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reason-
able person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication
and that does more than state without elaboration:
(1) Information contained in the public record.
(2) That the investigation is in progress.
(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description of the of-
fense and, if permitted by law, the identity of the victim.
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance in other
matters and the information necessary thereto.
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers.
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal
matter shall not, from the time of the filing of a complaint, information, or indict-
ment, the issuance of an arrest warrant, or arrest until the commencement of the
trial or disposition without trial, make or participate in making an extrajudicial
statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of
public communication and that relates to:
(1) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including arrests, in-
dictments, or other charges of crime) of the accused.
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a lesser of-
fense.
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given
by the accused or his refusal or failure to make a statement.
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or
failure of the accused to submit to examination or tests.
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness.
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the evidence, or
the merits of the case.
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(C) DR 7-107(B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from announcing:
(1) The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the accused.
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, any information necessary to aid
in his apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he may present.
(3) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence.
(4) The identity of the victim of the crime.
(5) The fact, time, and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of weapons.
(6) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the
length of the investigation.
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence seized, other
than a confession, admission, or statement.
(8) The nature, substance, or test of the charge.
(9) Quotations from or references to public records of the court in the case.
(10) The scheduling or result of any step in the judicial process.
(11) That the accused denies the charge made against him.
(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of the criminal matter, a lawyer or law
firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter shall not make
or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to the
trial, parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably likely to inter-
fere with a fair trial, except that he may quote from or refer without comment to the
public records of the court in the case.
(E) After completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a criminal matter and
prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or law firm associated with the prose-
cution or defense shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement
that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by public communica-
tions and that is reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence.
(F) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 also apply to professional disciplinary
proceedings and juvenile disciplinary proceedings when pertinent and consistent
with other law applicable to such proceedings.
(G) A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not during its investiga-
tion or litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement, other
than a 'quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or pro-
spective witness.
(3) The performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or
failure of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party, except as
required by law or administrative rule.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the action.
(H) During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer or law firm as-
sociated therewith shall not make or participate in making a statement, other than a
quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable person would ex-
pect to be disseminated by means of public communication if it is made outside the
official course of the proceeding and relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or pro-
spective witness.
(3) Physical evidence or the performance or results of any examinations or
tests of the refusal or failure of a party to submit to such.
(4) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair hearing.
(I) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 do not preclude a lawyer from replying to
charges of misconduct publicly made against him or from participating in the pro-
ceedings of legislative, administrative, or other investigative bodies.
(1) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees and associates
from making an extrajudicial statement that he would be prohibited from making
under DR 7-107.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-107 (1981).
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ultimately adopted.31 The Model Code is designed to serve as a
guide for attorney conduct,"3 2 and failure to comply with these
rules may constitute invocation of disciplinary proceedings.33
In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,34 the first appellate review
of the ABA rules governing attorneys' extrajudicial speech,3 5 the
Seventh Circuit struck down the "overbroad" ABA standard, which
restricted attorneys' comments about pending litigation if such
statements presented a "reasonable likelihood" of interfering with a
defendant's right to a fair trial.3 6 In its place, the court proposed
that judges proscribe only those comments that posed a "serious
and imminent threat" to the fair administration of justice.3 7 The
court reasoned that this narrower standard would put attorneys on
stricter notice regarding extrajudicial comments so they would not
have to tread the amorphous ground of "reasonable likelihood," as
set forth in DR 7-107.38
In addition to restricting attorneys' comments pending litiga-
tion, the Seventh Circuit endorsed specific rules, which incorpo-
rated the "serious and imminent threat" standard, to govern the
type of comments allowed during the trial process.39 Despite the
stricter "serious and imminent threat" standard, the Seventh Circuit
held DR 7-107(A) unconstitutional. According to the court, this
rule,40 could not apply to criminal defense attorneys because it
would prevent them from serving as a check against government
abuses during the prosecutorial-based investigatory stage.4 1 More
importantly, the court could not justify the broad restrictions man-
dated by DR 7-107(A) during the investigation of a criminal matter,
when prosecution of a case could not be assured and potential prej-
udice was too remote.4
2
Largely as a result of the Bauer decision, an ABA Task Force on
Fair Trial and Free Press (hereinafter referred to as the Goodwin
Committee) imposed a stricter standard, prohibiting lawyers from
31 Patricia A. Sallen, Comment, Gag Me With a Rule-Arizona Rules of Professional Con-
duct Rule 3.6 (1985), 114 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 115, 122-24 (1987).
32 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY preamble (1981).
33 Id.
34 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
35 Sally R. Weaver,Judicial Restrictions on Attorneys' Speech Concerning Pending Litigation:
Reconciling the Rights to Fair Trial and Freedom of Speech, 33 VAND. L. REV. 499, 506 (1980).
36 Bauer, 522 F.2d at 249.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 249-51.
40 See DR 7-107, supra note 30.




disseminating information that would pose a "clear and present
danger" to the fairness of a trial.43 The Committee recognized that
public comment about police work, criminal cases, and the adminis-
tration of criminal justice are areas of "pure speech," entitled to the
strongest possible presumption of First Amendment protection.44
The "reasonable likelihood" standard provided too loose a thresh-
old to offer lawyers full protection of their First Amendment rights.
As a result, the Goodwin Committee proposed that to be sanc-
tioned, an attorney's extrajudicial comments had to meet four crite-
ria: (1) the restriction had to promote a legitimate governmental
interest; (2) the comment had to seriously threaten the governmen-
tal interest to be protected; (3) the threat had to be likely to occur
imminently; and (4) the restriction had to be necessary to prevent
the governmental interest from being jeopardized. 45 The Commit-
tee also eliminated the per se prohibitions regarding extrajudicial
statements, recognizing that while statements have the potential to
undermine the fairness of a trial, such a result was not inevitable.
46
The ABA's House of Delegates adopted the Goodwin Report in Au-
gust 1978.
47
Despite the Goodwin Report, in Hirschkop v. Snead,48 the second
appellate case to interpret attorney no-comment rules, the Fourth
Circuit reverted back to the original standard of "reasonable likeli-
hood" proposed by the Reardon Report.49 The appellate court ap-
proved the "reasonable likelihood of interference" criterion
because DR 7-107 clearly listed the subject matters on which lawyers
could and could not comment. This clarity made lawyers aware, not
only that publication of certain kinds of information was prohibited,
but also that courts had the power to prohibit this action "without
extended controversy over the immediacy and gravity of the
threatened harm in the particular case." 50
The Fourth Circuit limited its holding to criminal and juvenile
jury trials. To apply this standard to anything but jury proceedings,
the court reasoned, would unfairly and substantially restrict attor-
43 ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Fair Trial and
Free Press 1 (2d Tent. Draft 1978) [hereinafter Goodwin Report].
44 Id. at 2-3. See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 586-87 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
45 Goodwin Report, supra note 43, at 3.
46 Id. at 4.
47 Stephanie J. Baker, Comment, Restrictions on Attorneys' Extrajudicial Comments on
Pending Litigation-The Constitutionality of Disciplinary Rule 7-107: Hirschkop v. Snead, 41
OHIO ST. LJ. 771, 780 (1980).
48 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
49 Id. at 362.
50 Id. at 368.
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neys' First Amendment rights. For this reason, the court declared
this standard constitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness, as
it pertained to bench trials, civil litigation, administrative hearings,
and disciplinary hearings. 51
In the early 1980s, the ABA drafted Model Rule 3.652 in an ef-
51 Id. at 371-74. The Court specifically prohibited attorneys in criminal (DR 7-
107(D)),juvenile (DR 7-107(F)), disciplinary (DR 7-107(F)), civil (DR 7-107(G)(5)), and
administrative proceedings (DR 7-107(H)(5)) from commenting on "other matters that
are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial."
52 Rule 3.6 Trial Publicity
(a) A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materi-
ally prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.
(b) A statement referred to in paragraph (a) ordinarily is likely to have such an
effect when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other
proceeding that could result in incarceration, and the statement relates to:
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party,
suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or
the expected testimony of a party or witness;
(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration,
the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of
any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or
that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;
(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal
or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or
nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in
a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;
(5) information the lawyer knows or should reasonably know is likely to
be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if disclosed create a substan-
tial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or
(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there
is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accu-
sation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven
guilty.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b)(1-5), a lawyer involved in the inves-
tigation or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration:
(1) the general nature of the claim or defense;
(2) the information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including the gen-
eral scope of the investigation, the offense or claim or defense involved and,
except where prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information nec-
essary thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved,
when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial
harm to an individual or to the public interest; and
(7) in a criminal case:
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the -ac-
cused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary
to aid in apprehension of that person;
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
(iv) the identity of investigation and arresting officers or agencies
and the length of the investigation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1983).
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fort to balance the interests of fair trial with free expression. 53 The
ABA based Rule 3.6 on the ABA Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility and the ABA Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free
Press, as amended in 1978.5 4
Rule 3.6 differs from DR 7-107 in three ways. First, Rule 3.6
adopts a standard somewhere in between Bauer and Hirschkop, re-
quiring that impermissible speech have a "substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."5 5 Second, Rule
3.6 prevents an attorney from discussing or describing seized physi-
cal evidence because it may be "substantially prejudicial,"' 56 espe-
cially if the court grants the defense's pretrial motion to suppress
the evidence at trial.57
Most importantly, Rule 3.6 presumes certain information will
have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing a trial.58 Rule 3.6 elimi-
nates the categories of statements that can be made at various stages
of the judicial process and instead, it creates six categories that pre-
sumptively violate the "substantial likelihood" standard if used in a
civil or criminal jury trial or pertain to a proceeding that could result
in imprisonment. 59 By creating this presumption, no-comment
rules anticipate that certain information will necessarily prejudice a
trial.
53 Thirty-two states have adopted ABA Model Rule 3.6 verbatim or with insignificant
changes. The following states have adopted the rule as written: Arizona, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wy-
oming. Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire, NewJersey, New York,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin have adopted Rule 3.6 with minor
changes. Michigan and Washington have adopted only subsection (a) of the rule, and
Minnesota, which also only adopted subsection (a), applies solely to pending criminal
jury trials. Utah adopted a version of Rule 3.6 that employs a "substantial likelihood of
materially influencing" test.
States that have adopted DR 7-107 verbatim include: Alaska, Colorado, Georgia,
Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Ohio, Tennessee, and Vermont. North Caro-
lina uses the "reasonable likelihood of... prejudic[e]" test. Virginia is the only state to
have explicitly adopted a "clear and present danger" standard, although four states-
Illinois, Maine, North Dakota, and Oregon-and the District of Columbia have adopted
standards that approximate this high threshold. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S.
Ct. 2720, 2741 (1991).




58 This Comment challenges this presumption since the same information that may
prejudice a trial will become public during pretrial proceedings. See infra Part V.
59 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1983).
19921
LYNN WEISBERG
III. THE SUPREME COURT ACCESS-TO-INFORMATION CASES
Attorney no-comment rules were needed throughout the 1960s
and 1970s due to courts' inexperience with publicity stemming from
high-profile cases. 60 By the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court had de-
cided a series of access-to-information cases, which granted the pub-
lic and the media the right to attend pretrial proceedings.6 1 These
decisions prevented trial courts from suppressing information with-
out providing a specific justification and a showing that less drastic
mechanisms could not achieve the same effect. The Court man-
dated a heavy burden of proof in order to protect coveted First
Amendment rights while, at the same time, assuring a defendant of
his constitutional right to a fair trial.62
These decisions incrementally eroded courts' power to close
courtroom proceedings or suppress information with a standard
one-line justification that such information would materially preju-
dice trial proceedings. Through these decisions, the Court system-
atically prohibited courts from imposing gag orders, which prevent
the media from publishing or broadcasting information emanating
from judicial proceedings, unless the appropriate burden of proof
was met.63 Next, the Court prevented courts from closing criminal
trials,64 voir dire,65 suppression hearings, 66 and preliminary hear-
ings.67 The Court reasoned that such restrictive mechanisms, even
when used to ensure criminal defendants of a fair trial, proved too
broad, too severe, and too invasive of First Amendment rights. 68 By
opening the courtroom doors as a matter of constitutional right, the
Court made available to the public the very same information that
attorney no-comment rules banned. This judicially mandated pub-
lic access to the courts defeated the very design and purpose of at-
torney no-comment rules.
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,69 the trial court issued a
restrictive order, prohibiting publication of evidence and testimony
60 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963);
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
61 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Waller v.
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984); Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
62 See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. 539.
63 Id.
64 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555.
65 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501.
66 WFaller, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
67 Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
68 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568 (1976).
69 Id.
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surrounding the subject of the trial until a jury was selected. The
evidence pertained to the murder of a Nebraska family, and it in-
cluded: the suspect's confession to police; his statements to third
parties; the contents of a note he wrote on the night of the crime;
certain medical testimony; the identity of those sexually assaulted;
and the nature of the assaults.70 On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme
Court upheld the restrictions imposed by the district court, but it
limited the gag order to the defendant's confessions and admis-
sions, and other "strongly implicative" facts.71
The United States Supreme Court categorically denied that
pretrial publicity inevitably leads to an unfair trial.72 Factors that
determine the degree of prejudice include the tone and extent of
the publicity, as well as the judge's efforts to mitigate the effects of
pretrial publicity.7 3 Considered the most serious infringement of
First Amendment rights, a prior restraint is an "immediate and irre-
versible sanction" that freezes publication of important
information.74
While the Court validated the trial judge's concern about the
potentially harmful effects of pretrial publicity, it noted that the
judge did not attempt to lessen the prejudicial impact through tac-
tics such as change of venue, continuance, intensive voir dire, jury
instructions, or sequestration. 75 The Court further ruled that the
trial court's order violated other principles that cannot be overrid-
den simply to enforce this prior restraint. For instance, at the pre-
liminary hearing, which was open to the press and public, testimony
referred to the suspect's confession to police and statements made
to third parties.76 The original gag order prohibited reporting this
information, which stood in direct conflict with the established prin-
ciple that the press can report anything that occurs in the court-
room. 77 On the basis of this principle, the testimony given in the
preliminary hearing could not have been subject to prior restraint
70 Id. at 543-44.
71 Id. at 545.
72 Id. at 554, 565.
73 Id. at 554-55.
74 Id. at 559.
75 Id. at 564-65.
76 Id. at 543.
77 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom ... of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. To further support this constitu-
tional right, the Supreme Court held that "[i]t is true that the public has the right to be
informed as to what occurs in its courts .... reporters of all media, including television,
are always present if they wish to be and are plainly free to report whatever occurs in
open court .... " Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1965).
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once the hearing was held. 78 As a result, the Supreme Court over-
ruled the imposition of a gag order, thereby allowing public dissem-
ination of evidence and testimony prior to jury selection.7 9
The Supreme Court increased public accessibility to court pro-
ceedings in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,80 holding that the
public and press had a constitutional right to attend criminal trials.
In this case, the indictment of a defendant for the murder of a hotel
employee resulted in four trials: the first conviction was reversed
after evidence was improperly admitted; the second and third trials
were declared mistrials.81 At the onset of the fourth trial, the court
granted the defense attorney's request to close the courtroom to the
public. The media argued that the judge had not based his ruling
on any evidentiary findings or considered less drastic alternatives.
8 2
The trial court upheld its ruling, reasoning that closing the trial
"doesn't completely override all rights of everyone else."8 3 The
next day, the trial judge acquitted the defendant in a directed
verdict.8
4
In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court held that an
open trial served a variety of purposes. First, public trials helped
ensure propriety and integrity in the judicial process, and they de-
terred perjured testimony, as well as prosecutorial and judicial mis-
conduct.8 5 Second, an open trial provided a prophylactic outlet for
societal concern, by satiating the public's appetite for justice and
uniting a community in shared emotion. 86 Third, the public learned
about the judicial system, and state and federal government, from
attending trials.8 7
The Court wrote that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
shared a common goal: to assure the freedom to communicate
about government functioning. 88 When the doors of a courtroom
close, so, too, does the right to express and receive ideas about gov-
ernment processes. This freedom would "lose much meaning if ac-
cess to observe the trial could, as it was here, be foreclosed
78 Estes, 381 U.S. at 567-68.
79 Id. at 570.
80 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
81 Id. at 559.
82 Id. at 560.
83 Id. at 561.
84 Id. at 562.
85 Id. at 569.
86 Id. at 571-72.
87 Id. at 572.
88 Id. at 575.
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arbitrarily."8 9 The Court held that even though the public's right to
attend a criminal trial is not explicitly stated in the Constitution, it is
a fundamental right implicit in the First Amendment.90 The Court
further criticized the trial court for its failure to explore alternatives
to closure.9 1 Without any findings to support public exclusion, the
Court ordered that criminal trials must be open to the public. 92
Building on the Richmond principle, the Court further expanded
the rights of the press by allowing its presence at voir dire proceed-
ings. 93 Prior to jury selection in a rape and murder trial, newspaper
publisher Press-Enterprise Co. requested that voir dire be open to
the public and the press. The trial judge ruled that this would in-
hibit the potential jurors' candor, which was necessary for the de-
fendant to receive a fair trial. The judge allowed the public and
press to be present for the general questioning, but privately con-
ducted all specific questioning regarding issues such as death pen-
alty and sexual crimes. During six weeks of voir dire, only three days
were open to the public.94 The court also denied Press-Enterprise's
request for copies of the voir dire transcripts, claiming that their re-
lease violated the jurors' right to privacy.95 The California Court of
Appeal denied Press-Enterprise's petition to release the transcript,
and it refused to reverse the trial court's decision to close the voir
dire hearing.96 The California Supreme Court denied petitioner's
request for a hearing.97
The United States Supreme Court reversed the appellate court
and ordered the voir dire proceedings open to the public and press. 98
Drawing upon its reasoning in Richmond, the Court held that public
access enhanced the fairness of the judicial system and unified the
community's cathartic reaction to violent crime and its need for jus-
tice.99 The Court stated, "Closed hearings, although not absolutely
precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs
the value of openness." 100 The trial court should have explained
89 Id. at 577.
90 The Court did not address whether this same right applies to civil cases, but it
noted that historically, both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open. Id.
at 580.
91 Id. at 580-81.
92 Id. at 581.
93 Press-Entrprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
94 Id. at 503.
95 Id. at 504.
96 Id. at 504-05.
97 Id. at 505.
98 Id. at 504-05.
99 Id. at 508-09.
100 Id. at 509.
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why these specific conversations required privacy, rather than sim-
ply making a blanket statement about inappropriate areas for public
discussion.' 0 ' Likewise, the court could have released those parts
of the transcript that were "dull and boring," 10 2 leaving sensitive
sections under seal.' 0 3 With the trial court considering nothing
short of closure, the Court held that voir dire should have been open
to the public.
10 4
That same year, the Supreme Court increased public access to
pretrial hearings, mandating that the stringent Press-Enterprise I crite-
ria' 0 5 be satisfied before closure of a suppression hearing may oc-
cur.10 6 Prior to the trial in Waller v. Georgia, the defendants tried to
suppress lawful wiretaps involving a lottery operation, as well as all
evidence collected during lawful searches. The state moved to close
the suppression hearing, arguing that in order to rebut the motion
to suppress evidence, it would introduce evidence that might violate
the privacy of individuals other than the defendants, which would
taint the evidence for future prosecutions. 10 7 The court ordered the
seven-day suppression hearing closed, during which time less than
150 minutes of wiretap tapes were played. These tapes mentioned
only one person who was not named in the indictment.108 The
Supreme Court reversed, stating that the court failed to give proper
weight to Sixth Amendment concerns, namely the defendant's right
to a public trial.10 9
The Court cited a litany of recent Supreme Court cases that
balanced a defendant's right to a fair trial with the right to open
court proceedings. 110 While these cases were based on First
101 Id. at 504.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 513.
104 Id.
105 The Waller Court held that the party seeking to close the hearing must state an
overriding interest likely to be prejudiced; the closure cannot be broader than necessary
to protect the specific interest; the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to
closure; and the court must make findings that support the closure. Waller v. Georgia,
467 U.S. 39 (1984) (citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 42.
108 Id. at 42-43. A jury later acquitted petitioners of racketeering but convicted them
of the gambling charges.
109 Id. at 43.
11o Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (a majority of the Court said the
public had a qualified constitutional right to attend pretrial suppression hearings,
although the Court did not consider this specific question); Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct. for Norfolk
County, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (both holding that the public and media have a constitu-
tional right to attend criminal trials); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (holding that
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Amendment protection, the Court reasoned that the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantee of a public trial I 11 also ensured that this hearing was
fair to the defendant.11 2 "The requirement of a public trial is for
the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt
with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of inter-
ested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their
responsibility . . ."113
The Court stated that a suppression hearing may be as impor-
tant as the actual trial.' 14 Often, in suppression hearings, police of-
ficers must take the stand and justify their conduct in procuring
invasive orders and seizing evidence. 115 These justifications are
given under oath and subject to cross-examination by opposing
counsel. Such testimony may produce allegations of police and
prosecutorial misconduct, which society has a strong interest in ex-
posing and subjecting to public scrutiny.116
To avoid indiscriminate closure of suppression hearings, the
Court held that the Press-Enterprise I test must be satisfied:
The party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding
interest that is likely to be prejudiced; the closure must be no broader
than necessary to protect that interest; the trial court must consider
reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make
findings adequate to support closure. 117
Using this standard, the Court found that the prosecutor's rationale
for closure was based solely on the evidence involving the wiretaps,
and that the proffer did not specify the privacy interests involved,
the effected portion of the tapes, or the manner in which such pri-
vacy would be violated. 81 8 In addition, the trial court failed to con-
sider any alternatives to total closure, such as closing only those
parts of the hearing thatjeopardized specific privacy interests."t 9 As
a result, closure of this suppression hearing was deemed
unconstitutional.
the public and press have a First Amendment right to attend voir dire proceedings). Wal-
ler, 467 U.S. at 44-45.
111 The Sixth Amendment states that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
112 Waller, 467 U.S. at 46.
113 1 T. COOLEY, CONsTrruriONAL LiMrrATiONs 647 (8th ed. 1927).
114 Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 (citing Gannett, 443 U.S. at 397 n.1 (Powell, J., Burger, CJ.,
concurring), 434-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
115 Id. at 47.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 48 (citing Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. 501, 511-12 (1984)). See supra notes 93-
104 and accompanying text.
118 Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.
119 Id. at 48.
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In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California,120 the Court
extended Waller by ruling that the media and public had a constitu-
tional right to attend preliminary hearings. The defendant, a nurse
charged with killing twelve patients by lethal injection, moved to
close the preliminary hearing. 121 Despite the fact that such a hear-
ing is presumed open unless a defendant's right to a fair trial is at
risk, the magistrate granted the motion because it feared the press
would only report one side of the case. 122 When the hearing ended
forty-one days later, the magistrate denied Press-Enterprise's re-
quest for the transcripts and sealed the record. 123
The United States Supreme Court cited the nearly uniform
practice of state and federal courts to conduct preliminary hearings
in open court. 124 The Court compared the preliminary hearing to a
trial: in both, the accused has a right to appear in court, to be repre-
sented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, to present exculpa-
tory evidence, and to exclude illegally obtained evidence. 125 Since
criminal trials are open to the public, the Court reasoned that pre-
liminary hearings should also be open. 126 In addition, the absence
of a jury at preliminary hearings makes the presence of the public
and media all the more essential as a safeguard against prosecutorial
misconduct and zealousness. 127 Again, the Court advised the trial
judge to consider alternatives before making such aggressive
decisions. 12
8
Together, these five Supreme Court access-to-information
cases 129 establish a strong foundation supporting the public's right
to pretrial and trial information within the courtroom. By requiring
certain conditions to be met before a courtroom is closed or a gag
order is imposed, the Court reinforced that First Amendment rights
are a coveted societal value, deserving the utmost protection. Any
120 Press-Enterprise H, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
121 Id. at 3. At the preliminary hearing, the state presented primarily medical and
scientific evidence, as well as the testimony of some of the defendant's co-workers. Id. at
4.
122 Id. at 4.
123 Id. at 5. The court later released the transcript after the defendant waived his right
to a jury trial. Id.
124 Id. at 10. The Court distinguished between grand jury proceedings, which are
typically closed to the public, and preliminary hearings, which are conducted in open
court before a magistrate.
125 Id. at 12.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 12-13.
128 Id. at 14-15.
129 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Waller v. Geor-
gia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984); Press-Enterprise 1I, 478 U.S. 1.
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limitation on these rights, absent a showing that infringement is
necessary to effectively protect an overriding interest, is
unconstitutional.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN GENTILE v. STATE BAR OF
NEVADA
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, the United States Supreme
Court upheld the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice"
standard used to govern lawyers' extrajudicial speech. °30 It also de-
clared that Nevada Rule 177, as written, was unconstitutionally
vague because it failed to clearly distinguish between permissible
and impermissible speech.'t3 As a result of its grammatical ambigu-
ity, the rule failed to provide Gentile with fair notice as to what he
could say without fear of discipline.' 3 2 In its attempt to address at-
torney no-comment rules, however, the Court failed to remedy the
ambiguity of the rule. Moreover, it did not take into consideration
the previously decided access-to-information cases, which unravel
the very purpose of attorney no-comment rules.
On January 31, 1987, undercover Las Vegas police officers dis-
covered four kilograms of cocaine and almost $300,000 in travelers'
checks missing from a safe deposit box, which was rented by the
police department's Intelligence Bureau from Western Vault Cor-
poration.133 Police quickly discounted as suspects the two police of-
ficers who had access to the deposit box 3 4 and instead focused on
Western Vault owner Grady Sanders, 3 5 represented by attorney
Dominic Gentile. During the investigation, the police commander
announced that the two officers passed polygraph tests, but that
Western Vault would not allow its employees to submit to lie detec-
tor tests.' 3 6 In February 1988, the Clark County grand jury indicted
Sanders. 3 7 Six weeks after the theft, Western Vault closed due to
130 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2742-45 (1991).
131 Id. at 2731.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 2720.
134 Harold Hyman, Metro Uses Dogs to Search Safes, LAS VEGAS SUN, Feb. 12, 1987;Joint
Appendix, supra note 1, at 110.
135 Alan Tobin, Officer: Vault Heist Targeted Metro Sting, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Mar. 12,
1987, at 1B; Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 90-91.
136 Alan Tobin & Warren Bates, Vault Owner Indicted in Deposit Box Thefts, LAS VEGAS
REv.-J., Feb. 6, 1988, at IA; Pauline Bell & Harold Hyman, Metro Missing $1.3 Million in
Drugs, Checks, Jury Indicts Vault Owner on $2.5 Million Theft Charge, LAS VEGAS SUN, Feb. 6,
1988, at IA; Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 100-03, 127-29.
137 Sanders was charged with two counts of racketeering, eight counts of grand lar-
ceny, and one count of trafficking a controlled substance. Tobin & Bates, supra note
136; Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 100-03.
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unfavorable press, the issuance of search warrants at the facility, and
the breach of client confidentiality. 138
Immediately following the arraignment, Gentile held a press
conference to proclaim his client's innocence and combat negative
pretrial publicity.139 In a brief statement, Gentile presented his the-
ory that the two police officers were the most likely suspects, and
that three potential witnesses were known drug dealers and con-
victed money launderers. 140 Noting Nevada's Rules of Professional
Responsibility, Gentile refused to comment about which witnesses
had drug backgrounds or about inadmissible trial evidence, such as
polygraph test results.141 Ajury acquitted Sanders of all charges. 142
The State Bar of Nevada filed a complaint against Gentile,
charging that his statements at the press conference violated Nevada
Supreme Court Rule 177,143 which prohibits attorneys from making
extrajudicial statements that a lawyer knows or reasonably should
know would have a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudic-
ing" an adjudication. The Disciplinary Board determined that Gen-
tile violated the rule and recommended a private reprimand.144 The
138 Alan Tobin, Vault Firm to Close its Doors, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Mar. 26, 1987, at IB;
Burglarized Vault Firm Closes Doors, LAS VEGAS SUN, Mar. 26, 1987; Joint Appendix, supra
note I, at 92-93, 114.
139 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2728 (1991).
140 Id. at 2736-37.
141 "QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Dominic, you mention you question the
credibility of some of the witnesses, some of the people named as victims in the
government indictment.
Can we go through it and elaborate on their backgrounds, interests-
MR. GENTILE: I can't because ethics prohibit me from doing so.
Last night before I decided I was going to make a statement, I took a good
close look at the Rules of Professional Responsibility. There are things that I can
say and there are things that I can't. Okay
I can't name which of the people have the drug backgrounds. I'm sure you
guys can find that by doing just a little bit of investigative work."
Id. at 2731-32.
142 Id. at 2731.
143 Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 uses the same language as Model Rule 3.6. See
Model Rule 3.6, supra note 52.
144 The board focused on the following six statements made by Gentile:
(1) "... the evidence will prove not only that Grady Sanders is an innocent person
and had nothing to do with any of the charges that are being levelled against him, but
that the person that was in the most direct position to have stolen the drugs and the
money, the American Express Traveller's checks, is Detective Steve Scholl."
(2) "There is far more evidence that will establish that Detective Scholl took these
drugs and took these American Express Traveller's checks than any other living human
being."
(3) "Now, with respect to these other charges that are contained in this indictment,
the so-called other victims, as I sit here today I can tell you that one, two-four of them
are known drug dealers and convicted money launderers and drug dealers; three of
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Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. 145
The United States Supreme Court considered whether courts
could regulate attorneys' speech by the same standard applied to
the press-"clear and present danger" of "actual prejudice or immi-
nent threat"-or whether courts could impose disciplinary action by
applying a lower standard. 146 The Court held that the lower thresh-
old of "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" satisfied the
First Amendment, but that Nevada's Rule 17714 7 was "void for
vagueness" because its safe-harbor provisions misled Gentile into
believing his speech was protected. t 48
Justice Rehnquist, who authored a discrete part of the majority
opinion,149 stated that attorney speech has always been constrained
by limits both in and out of the courtroom.' 50 For instance, while in
court, a lawyer cannot oppose a court ruling beyond what is neces-
sary to preserve an issue for appeal.151 Likewise, out of court, attor-
neys are subject to ethical restrictions on speech that do not apply to
the average citizen. According to Justice Rehnquist, lawyers are
regulated by a higher standard because they are officers of the court,
whose speech may be interpreted as "especially authoritative."' 152
As a result, they must adhere to the governing principles of the
whom didn't say a word about anything until after they were approached by Metro and
after they were already in trouble and are trying to work themselves out of something."
(4) "Now, up until this moment, of course, that [the other victims] started going
along with what detectives from Metro wanted them to say, these people were being
held out as being incredible and liars by the very same people who are going to say now
that you can believe them."
(5) "I think Grady Sanders was indicted because he-he was a scapegoat the day
they opened the [safe-deposit] box."
(6) "We've got some video tapes that if you take a good look at them, I'll tell you
what, he [Detective Scholl] either had a hell of a cold or he should have seen a better
doctor."
The Board concluded these statements had a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing the Sanders trial. First, they related to the character, credibility, reputation,
and criminal record of witnesses, which violated Rule 177(2)(a). Second, they contained
an opinion regarding Sanders' guilt or innocence, prohibited by Rule 177(2)(d). Joint
Appendix, supra note 1, at 2-4.
145 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 787 P.2d 386, 387 (Nev. 1990). See also Gentile v.
State Bar of Nevada, Ill S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
146 Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2742-43.
147 Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 uses the same language as Model Rule 3.6. See
Model Rule 3.6, supra note 52.
148 Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2731.
149 Justice Rehnquist authored the first two sections of the majority opinion and Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote the last section. Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Souterjoined
Justice Rehnquist in his majority opinion.
150 Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2740-41.
151 Id. at 2743.
152 Id. at 2745.
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criminal justice system, which assure defendants of an impartial trial
and maintain the fair administration ofjustice. 153
Justice Rehnquist upheld the constitutionality of the "substan-
tial likelihood of material prejudice" standard as one which provides
a permissible balance between attorneys' First Amendment rights in
pending cases and the state's interest in fair trials. 154 First, this stan-
dard protects the integrity and fairness of the state judicial sys-
tem. 155 Second, it imposes "only narrow and necessary" limitations
on attorney speech: it is limited to comments that are substantially
likely to have a materially prejudicial effect; it is equally applied to
all attorneys in a pending case; and it simply postpones such com-
ments until after trial. 156 The Court added that this standard pre-
vents attorneys from imposing costs on the judicial system through
procedures, such as change of venue or extended voir dire, which
cannot always mute all effects of pretrial publicity. 157 In the name of
preserving the integrity of the trial process,Justice Rehnquist stated
that such limitations are justified. 158
Justice Kennedy, 159 in a partial concurrence, 160 did not con-
sider the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard
"necessarily flawed."' 161 The phraseology of varying standards, ar-
gued Justice Kennedy, was not determinative: "A rule governing
speech . . . need not use the words 'clear and present danger' in
order to pass constitutional muster."' 162 He argued that the differ-
ence among standards, such as "clear and present danger," "sub-
stantial likelihood of material prejudice," and "serious and
imminent threat," may be semantics. 163 Regardless of the wording,
each standard must assess proximity and degree of harm.164 While
Rule 177-Nevada's adaptation of attorney no-comment rules-
meets these requirements under the First Amendment, Justice Ken-
nedy argued that the Nevada Supreme Court did not interpret the
153 Id. at 2744.





159 Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined with Justice Kennedy in Parts I
and II of his opinion.
160 Although concurring, Justice Kennedy comes from a diametrically opposed view
on the role and responsibility in communicating information about a client's case, de-
spite the potential impact on trial.
161 Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
162 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
163 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
164 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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rule in conformity with these principles.1 65 Gentile should not have
reasonably known that his comments would create a substantial like-
lihood of materially prejudicing his client's case, said Justice Ken-
nedy, nor did the Nevada Supreme Court offer any proof to this
effect. 166
Justice Kennedy validated Gentile's motives for holding the
press conference: to counter prejudicial pretrial publicity and to
prevent further suffering by his client.1 67 A lawyer may take reason-
able steps to defend a client's reputation and offset adverse conse-
quences of prosecution, Justice Kennedy wrote, especially if the
prosecution is unjust or improper.1 68 A defense attorney, through
lawfully permitted strategies, may try to get indictment charges dis-
missed or reduced, including demonstrating "in the court of public
opinion that the client does not deserve to be tried."1
69
Justice Kennedy noted that (1) Gentile's press conference oc-
curred well before the trial; (2) Clark County contained a large jury
pool from which to select an untainted jury; (3) Gentile did not dis-
cuss any inadmissible evidence, such as polygraph results or any
item recovered in searches; (4) the media excerpted coverage of the
press conference so that the public did not hear most of the com-*
ments; (5) despite the press conference, the general public favored
the prosecution due to repeated police and prosecution statements
during the preceding months; and (6) both jury selection and the
trial proceeded without incident. 170 As a result, Justice Kennedy
concluded that no prejudicial harm occurred to warrant Gentile's
reprimand.
Unlike the majority, justice Kennedy1 71 did not believe that Ne-
vada should be allowed to interpret its requirement of "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" using more deferential criteria
than the accepted First Amendment standard. 172 He rejected the
majority's balancing of the state's interest in regulating attorney
speech against a lawyer's First Amendment rights, explaining that
the contexts in which such a test is appropriate-commercial speech
by lawyers or limitations on the use of information obtainable only
165 Id. at 2725-26 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
166 Id. at 2726 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
167 Id. at 2728 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168 Id. at 2728-29 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
169 Id. at 2729 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
170 Id. at 2729-30 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171 Justice Kennedy's discussion of his disagreement with a portion of the majority
decision is found in sections IV and V of the opinion.




through the discovery process-did not apply in Gentile.'73 Justice
Kennedy also disagreed with the majority's belief that attorney
speech must be regulated to ensure an impartial trial. Constitution-
ally protected rights, he said, outweigh infractions of disciplinary
rules. 174
According to Justice Kennedy, even if the Court balanced
whether a substantial government interest is furthered by limiting
speech and whether this limitation is tailored to protect the specific
governmental interest at issue, Nevada's interpretation of Rule 177
would still fail.175 Without any cited factual or anecdotal proof that
a defense lawyer's public statements have ever prejudiced the state's
prosecution of a case, or any empirical data showing the pervasive
danger of prejudice due to pretrial publicity, little justification exists
for a lower standard of First Amendment scrutiny. t 76 The police
and prosecution have far more ways, both within and beyond the
scope of no-comment rules, to disseminate information to the pub-
lic. 77 The defendant, however, may not feel free to speak, fearful of
self-incrimination and tainting his defense. Without an advocate, a
defendant is mute.' 78 This result reinforces the conclusion that
blanket rules governing defense attorneys' speech should first be
subject to First Amendment scrutiny."79
Attorney no-comment rules do not prohibit an attorney from
speaking with the press, wrote Justice Kennedy.180 Even as an "of-
ficer of the court," a lawyer may comment to the press, so long as
the statements do not have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing a
trial or adjudicative proceeding.' 8 ' Lawyers, unlike nonparticipants
in the legal system, have a fiduciary obligation to the court, which
prohibits them from thwarting the judicial process. If sequestration
or continuances became continually necessary as a result of the prej-
udicial effect of attorneys' speech, "a substantial governmental in-
173 Id. at 2733 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 2734 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
175 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
176 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In the oral argument before the Supreme Court, the
State Bar of Nevada admitted that Rule 177(2) created no evidentiary presumption at an
adjudicative proceeding. In other words, while Rule 177 provides guidance, the bar still
bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the extrajudicial
statements caused a substantial likelihood of material prejudice. Transcript of Oral Ar-
gument before the Supreme Court of the United States in the Matter of Gentile v. State
Bar of Nevada (Apr. 15, 1991).
177 Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2735 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
178 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
179 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
180 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
181 Id. (Kennedy. J., dissenting).
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terest might support additional regulation of speech."' 18 2 In this
case, however, Gentile's speech carried so little weight that the
Court could not wholly recommend restriction of attorney free
speech.' 83 Rule 177's application to Gentile "represents a limitation
of First Amendment freedoms greater than is necessary or essential
to the protection of the particular governmental interest, and does
not protect against a danger of the necessary gravity, imminence, or
likelihood"'184 to justify this limitation.
In his part of the majority opinion, 18 5 Justice Kennedy held
Rule 177, as interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court, void for
vagueness because the safe-harbor provisions of Rule 177(3) led
Gentile to believe he could comment on certain topics without fear
of discipline. Under Rule 177(3) (a), an attorney may discuss "with-
out elaboration" the general nature of a defense, "notwithstanding"
subsections 1 and 2(a-f).' 8 6 Thus, a lawyer can comment on his cli-
ent's general defense theory "without elaboration," even if the re-
marks refer to the character, credibility, reputation, or criminal
record of witnesses, or if the lawyer knows or reasonably should
have known the statement will have a substantial likelihood of mate-
rial prejudice. 8
7
The Court stated that a lawyer's right to comment on the "gen-
eral" nature of the defense theory "without elaboration" provided
insufficient guidelines.' 88 An attorney trying to work within the con-
text of these rules is forced to "guess at its contours," resulting in
haphazard speculation about proper usage.189 Without a settled in-
terpretation of these rules, "the lawyer has no principle for deter-
mining when his remarks pass from the safe harbor of the general to
the forbidden sea of the elaborated."' 190 Gentile believed he was
abiding by Rule 177(3) by refusing to elaborate on the backgrounds
of potential witnesses.' 9 ' Nonetheless, the Nevada Supreme Court
said these comments went beyond the scope of appropriate
speech. 192 That Gentile violated the rules even after researching
them proved that Rule 177 creates a trap for both the wary and
182 Id. at 2735-36 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 2736 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
184 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
185 Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor joined Justice Kennedy in
holding Rule 177 void for vagueness.










Dissenting to the majority's ruling that Rule 177 was void for
vagueness, Justice Rehnquist194 argued that for a rule to be over-
broad, it must prohibit constitutionally protected conduct, 195 and
to be unconstitutional, the overbreadth must be substantial.196 Rule
177 is no broader than required to protect the State's interests: it
applies only to lawyers involved in pending cases and only to com-
ments that present a risk of material prejudice to a trial.197
According to Justice Rehnquist, Rule 177 provided Gentile with
sufficient notice of discipline because it listed unacceptable conduct
that posed a threat to the fair administration of justice. 198 Having
studied the rules, Gentile could not complain about a lack of notice
because he admitted he called the press conference specifically to
influence potential jurors. 99 While the dissent acknowledged that
Gentile held the press conference well in advance of trial, it agreed
with the Nevada Supreme Court that Gentile timed his comments,
which immediately followed his client's arraignment, to have maxi-
mum impact. Gentile would not have held the press conference, the
dissent argued, if he had not believed he would have a substantial
likelihood of influencing the venire and countering previous public-
ity.200 The dissent concluded that, as an attorney, Gentile swore to
uphold the Rules of Professional Conduct; the First Amendment did
not excuse him from honoring this oath. 20 1
The Supreme Court access-to-information cases demonstrate a
strong presumption for First Amendment rights, criticizing trial
courts for attempting to restrict the public's access to information
through open court proceedings. Within these proceedings, how-
ever, the same prejudicial information prohibited by attorney no-
comment rules is available for public consumption in open court.
These two lines of cases are not reconciled in Gentile and, as a result,
they stand pitted on a "collision course" 20 2 with each other.
Two ways exist for prejudicial information to be disseminated
193 Id.
194 Justices White, Scalia, and Souter joined Justice Rehnquist in his dissent.
195 Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2746 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114
(1972)) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
196 Id. (citing Board of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 485
(1989)) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
197 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
198 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
199 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
200 Id. at 2747 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
201 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
202 My apologies to Justice O'Connor, who used the phrase in reference to Roe v. Wade
in City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983).
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to the public prior to trial. An attorney may talk to the press outside
of the courtroom, or an attorney may talk to ajudge or magistrate in
open court proceedings. By restraining a lawyer's extrajudicial
speech, the Court in Gentile ignores the practical way in which infor-
mation is disseminated. For instance, evidence seized without a
search warrant may be discussed in a publicly filed motion to sup-
press and later argued at a hearing in open court. This Comment
argues that in seeking to preclude this information from public con-
sumption, the Court imposes an unconstitutional restraint on law-
yers that ultimately does not accomplish its intended purpose.
Historically, the Court has carefully guarded freedom of
speech, deeming prior restraints the "most serious and the least tol-
erable infringement on First Amendment rights." 203 To justify im-
position of a prior restraint, parties have traditionally carried a
heavy burden of proof. A unanimous Supreme Court held in Organ-
ization for a Better Austin v. Keefe that "any prior restraint on expres-
sion comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its
constitutional validity."'20 4 Likewise, in Procunier v. Martinez, the
Court declared that "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms
must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of
the particular governmental interest involved." 20 5 The Court up-
held the high value placed on free speech in Press-Enterprise I by im-
posing an equally stringent standard that required court hearings to
be open to the public unless an overriding interest is likely to be
prejudiced. 20 6 Further, the closure must be no broader than is nec-
essary to protect that interest, and the trial court must consider rea-
sonable alternatives to closure. 20 7 If these conditions are not met so
that a prior restraint or closure fails to accomplish its intended pur-
pose, the limitation is unconstitutional. 208
Attorney no-comment rules impose a serious prior restraint on
speech, but they fail to show that the overriding interest in a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial is likely to be prejudiced. The fact that the
same information these rules seek to suppress surfaces in public,
203 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1975). See also Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
204 Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1971) (respondent real
estate broker did not meet heavy burden to justify imposition of prior restraint on com-
munity's peaceful distribution of informational pamphlets).
205 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (prison officials' censorship of
inmates' direct personal correspondence violated prisoners' First Amendment rights).
206 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510-11 (1984). Such alternatives include voir dire,
change of venue, continuance, extensive jury instructions, or jury sequestration.
207 Id.
208 See Org. for a Better Austin, 402 U.S. 415; Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539 (1976); Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
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pretrial, and trial proceedings indicates that the restraint is, at the
very least, ineffective and, at most, unconstitutional. Attorney no-
comment rules do not prevent an attorney from disseminating infor-
mation; they only postpone the time and change the forum in which
this information is discussed. These rules fail to accomplish the nar-
rowly tailored goal of protecting certain prejudicial information
from public dissemination and therefore, they cannot constitution-
ally justify restriction of lawyers' free speech.
V. ELIMINATION OF ATrORNEY NO-COMMENT RULES
As previously stated, almost all information prohibited by attor-
ney no-comment rules becomes available at various pretrial hear-
ings. Such proceedings include preliminary hearings, in which the
judge assesses whether probable cause exists to hold a suspect over
for trial;20 9 bond hearings, in which the judge determines whether
to release a defendant on bail, and if so, sets the amount of the
bond;210 arraignment, where the judge advises a defendant of the
formal charges against him, and the defendant enters a plea;211 and
suppression hearings, in which a defendant seeks to prevent the in-
troduction of evidence on legal grounds.2 1 2 While these procedures
may vary between federal and state jurisdictions, all courts hold pre-
trial hearings that elicit similar information.
Model Rule 3.6 prohibits all extrajudicial statements that a law-
yer should reasonably know will have a "substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative hearing."21 3 It also lists
seven categories from which an attorney may state information, but
without elaboration.21 4 Nearly all the information banned by Model
Rule 3.6 is available in routine courtroom procedures that are open
to the public. As a result, the realities of legal procedure and the
practical effect of the access-to-information cases thwart the pur-
209 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 14.1(a) (1985).
210 Id. §§ 12.1(a),(b).
211 Id. § 20.4.
212 Id. § 10.5(a).
213 See Model Rule 3.6, supra note 52.
214 Id. These categories include the general nature of the claim or defense; the infor-
mation available in public records; the fact that an investigation is ongoing and the gen-
eral scope of the investigation, including the offense or claim or defense involved and
the identity of the persons, except where prohibited by law; the scheduling or result of
any litigation stage; a request for assistance in gathering evidence; a danger warning
concerning the behavior of a person involved if an individual or the public interest is at
risk; and in a criminal case, basic facts about the status of the accused; information to aid
in the apprehension of the accused, if necessary; the fact, time, and place of arrest; and
the identity of the agencies or officers involved in the arrest or investigation.
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pose of attorney no-comment rules, which is to prevent dissemina-
tion of information that might prejudice a defendant's trial.
Model Rule 3.6 prohibits attorneys from disseminating much of
the same information that becomes available during an open-court
preliminary hearing. Model Rule 3.6(b)(1) bars discussion of the
character, credibility, reputation, or criminal record of a party, sus-
pect, or witness in a criminal investigation, as well as a witness' iden-
tity or expected testimony.2 15 Yet, a witness' identity is immediately
known upon taking the stand at a preliminary hearing, and his credi-
bility may be tested through opposing counsel's cross-examination.
All witnesses, especially those who have a checkered criminal past or
are cooperating with the government place their character and cred-
ibility at issue, specifically if their testimony will affect whether the
suspect will be tried.
Even if the only witness at a preliminary hearing is a police of-
ficer, the very information that attorney no-comment rules prohibit
is likely to be revealed. For instance, according to Model Rule
3.6(c) (7),216 attorneys may state only the bare facts-without elabo-
ration-about the following information: the accused's identity, res-
idence, occupation, and family status; the fact, time, and place of
arrest; and the identity of investigating and arresting officers or
agencies. Yet, if a suspect is arrested at home or while on the job,
details about the suspect's home or work, as well as information
about the suspect's family and the nature of the arrest will be dis-
closed. In fact, the officer may fully testify as to his detailed partici-
pation in the arrest.
Information apt to be revealed by law enforcement officers in-
cludes the execution of any search,2 17 interviews of witnesses on the
scene,218 interrogations of the suspect, the performance of any in-
culpatory tests, 2 19 such as a breathalizer, blood, or drug tests, and
whether the suspect made a statement or exercised her right to si-
lence220 pursuant to a Miranda warning.221 Even if this information
is not disclosed on direct examination, the defense attorney may
cross-examine the witness and extract this same information. In ad-
dition, a material witness who testifies at the preliminary hearing
also violates the intent of no-comment rules by publicizing his ex-
215 See Model Rule 3.6(b)(1), supra note 52.
216 Id.
217 See Model Rule 3.6(b)(3), supra note 52.
218 See Model Rule 3.6(b)(1), supra note 52.
219 See Model Rule 3.6(b)(3), supra note 52.
220 See Model Rule 3.6(b)(2), supra note 52.
221 The contents of the admission or confession may not necessarily be disclosed at
the preliminary hearing pursuant to evidentiary rules regarding hearsay.
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pected testimony. While lawyers often try to prevent witnesses from
testifying on the record prior to the actual trial so as not create im-
peachment material, this is not always avoidable. In such cases, a
witness may testify at the preliminary hearing as to specific actions
allegedly committed by the defendant; the witness may then later
recount this same testimony during the actual trial. By previewing
his testimony during a pretrial hearing, the witness may impede the
very purpose of preventing an attorney from discussing anticipated
testimony.
In Gentile, the local media covered most of the information that
Gentile "disclosed" to the public well before any preliminary pro-
ceedings. The daily newspapers reported the theft in February
1987222 and proceeded to divulge other information that normally
would surface during a preliminary hearing, such as the officers'
names, the main suspect (Grady Sanders), 223his occupation, 224 place
of business, 225 alleged past bad acts, 226 Sanders' rebuttal to these
reported acts, 227 and the results of the police officers' polygraph 228
and drug229 tests. Had the press not reported this information,
many of the details may not have been known until trial since a state
grand jury indicted Sanders, 230 eliminating the need for a prelimi-
nary hearing. 23 ' Unless the court seals the grand jury indictment,
however, the document is usually available and contains such infor-
mation as the approximate date of the offense, the alleged crime,
and the name of the defendant and any co-conspirators. 23 2
Bond hearings, which are typically open to the public, may also
222 Alan Tobin, Burglary of Police Vault Probed, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Feb. 2, 1987, at IA;
Ed Koch, Loot, Drugs Stolen from Metro Safe, LAS VEGAS SUN, Feb. 2, 1987, at IA; Joint
Appendix, supra note 1, at 84-86, 104-05.
223 Tobin, supra note 135; Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 90-9 1.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Detective Thomas Dillard filed an affidavit with the Clark County District Court,
alleging that in the past, Sanders previously had drilled open customers' deposit boxes
without permission and found illegal drugs at least 15 times, but he did not report these
incidents to the police. Tobin, supra note 222.
227 Synopsis of KLAS News Broadcasts (Mar. 10, 1987); Joint Appendix, supra note 1,
at 130.
228 Ed Koch, Reward Offered in Vault Cases; 2 Officers Cleared, I-As VEGAS SUN, Mar. 11,
1987; Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 112-13.
229 9 Pounds of Cocaine Part of Metro Heist, LAs VEGAS REv.-J., Feb. 5, 1987, at 1B; Joint
Appendix, supra note 1, at 88-89.
230 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2728 (1991).
231 In grand jury proceedings, neither the hearing nor the evidence presented to the
grand jury are open to the public. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 209, §§ 8.1, 8.5(b).
232 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c) states that "the indictment or information
shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting
the offense charged." FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c). Many states have provisions that are almost
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reveal certain information that attorney no-comment rules attempt
to conceal. At a bond hearing, the judge determines if a suspect
may be released on a personal or recognizance bond, which does
not require a monetary deposit, or a cash bail bond, which requires
that at least ten percent of the total amount of the bond be paid to
assure the defendant's appearance at future court proceedings.
233
At bond hearings in state courts, a judge weighs the nature and
severity of a crime, the strength of the case against the defendant,
and the suspect's prior criminal record. 234 In federal courts, judges
usually consider a larger number of factors in their determinations,
pursuant to the 1984 Bail Reform Act.235 In order to show that the
suspect has strong community ties that will ensure his presence at
trial, the defense attorney may discuss the suspect's family, employ-
ment, residence, and even reputation in the community. 236 This is
the same information either prohibited or strictly curtailed outside
of the courtroom under Model Rule 3.6.237 Likewise, the prosecu-
tion may bring to light a suspect's prior criminal history to show that
the suspect is a threat to society or to negatively reflect his character
in order to increase the amount of the bond. As previously dis-
cussed, attorney no-comment rules ban references to the defend-
ant's character and past criminal record.
238
Information that is precluded by attorney no-comment rules
also surfaces in open-court arraignments. At the arraignment, the
defendant appears in court and enters a plea of either not guilty,
guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, or nolo contendere, which has
the same effect as a guilty plea.239 This pretrial proceeding is at
odds with Model Rule 3.6(b)(4),240 which bans comments that con-
tain "any opinion as to the guilt or innocence" of a defendant.
While a formal plea disclosed at arraignment may not be considered
identical to the federal rules provisions. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 209, §§ 19.2
(a),(d).
233 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 209, § 12.1(b).
234 Id. A judge has the discretion to inquire into a defendant's character and back-
ground, but he may choose not to do so due to time constraints. Id.
235 The 1984 Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1985), specifies that the following
factors should be considered in determining bail conditions for federal crimes: the na-
ture of the crime; the weight of the evidence against the suspect; the history and charac-
teristics of the individual, including character, physical and mental condition, family and
community ties, employment, financial resources, past alcohol or drug abuse, past crimi-
nal record, any danger posed to society, and parole or probationary status, if applicable,
at the time of the offense or arrest.
236 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 209, § 12.1(d).
237 See Model Rule 3.6(b)(1) and 3.6(c)(7)(i), supra note 52.
238 See Model Rule 3.6(b)(1), supra note 52.
239 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 209, § 20.4(a).
240 See Model Rule 3.6(b)(4), supra note 52.
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an "opinion," the plea itself constitutes a statement that the defense
intends to prove through evidence presented at trial. In that sense,
Grady Sanders' "not guilty" plea at the arraignment did not differ
significantly from Gentile's statement regarding Sanders' innocence
at the press conference:
When this case goes to trial, and as it develops, you're going to see
that the evidence will prove not only that Grady Sanders is an innocent
person and had nothing to do with any of the charges that are being
leveled against him, but that the person that was in the most direct
position to have stolen the drugs and the money... is Detective Steve
Scholl.24
1
Obviously, if the defendant pleads guilty to the charges against
him, there is no risk that attorney comments will prejudice the de-
fendant, as no adjudicative hearing will take place. However, if the
defendant pleads not guilty, the judge will set a trial schedule. At
this time, the defense may inform the court of plans to file pretrial
motions, such as a suppression motion, which may seek to exclude
certain evidence alleged to have been obtained illegally.242
Pretrial hearings often bring to light information specifically
prohibited by Model Rule 3.6, namely the existenc6 or contents of a
confession, admission, or statement by the suspect; 24 3 the perform-
ance or results of an examination or test;2 4 4 statements concerning
the character, credibility, or reputation of a witness; 24 5or informa-
tion the lawyer knows or should reasonably know will be inadmissi-
ble as evidence at trial, such as illegally seized property.246 In a
written suppression motion or at an in-court hearing, Fourth
Amendment 247 and Fifth Amendment 248 violations, in the form of
241 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada at 4,
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991) (No. 89-1836). Although Gentile
did not carry the burden of proving who committed the crime, jurors stated that had
Scholl been charged, they would have convicted him. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at
34.
242 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 209, § 10.1(a). This evidence may be mentioned as
early as the preliminary hearing, however, the circumstances are most fully discussed at
the suppression hearing. The suppression hearing is presumptively open, according to
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), unless the party who moves to close the hearing
presents an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; the closure is no broader
than necessary to protect the interest; the trial court considers alternatives to closure;
and the findings adequately support closure of the hearing.
243 See Model Rule 3.6(b)(2), supra note 52.
244 See Model Rule 3.6(b)(3), supra note 52.
245 See Model Rule 3.6(b)(1), supra note 52.
246 See Model Rule 3.6(b)(5), supra note 52.
247 The Fourth Amendment protects people against "unreasonable searches and
seizures" and requires search warrants to be supported by probable cause and itemized
regarding the location to be searched and the persons or items to be seized. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
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coerced confessions, illegally seized evidence, or warrantless
searches, 249 are most likely to be cited as the cause of the illegally
seized evidence. The defense may also allege police and/or
prosecutorial misconduct, including the names of the officers in-
volved in such misconduct, the nature of the violation, the contents
of any confession, and/or the items seized in the search. Attorney
no-comment rules, while prohibiting public discussion by lawyers,
do not prevent the information from entering the public forum.
What is forbidden to be discussed outside the courtroom is often
the very same information discussed in the open courtroom.
This process of public dissemination is illustrated in the Sand-
ers' case. Shortly after the theft, police announced that the two intel-
ligence bureau detectives with access to the vault had voluntarily
taken and passed drug tests.250 At his press conference, Gentile
stated that:
[T]he person that was in the most direct position to have stolen the
drugs and the money, the American Express Travelers' checks, is
Detective Steve Scholl. There is far more evidence that will establish
that Detective Scholl took these drugs ... than any other living human
being.... We've got some videotapes that if you take a look at them
... [Detective Scholl] either had a hell of a cold or he should have seen
a better doctor.
251
In a pretrial motion, Gentile sought to compel production of
hair exemplars from Detective Steve Scholl and two other detec-
tives, believed by Gentile to have used cocaine. 252 In this motion,
Gentile stated the underlying facts surrounding the detectives' ac-
cess to the safe deposit box containing large amounts of cocaine; the
high degree of inaccuracy of urinalysis tests for the detection of co-
caine; and the relevancy of an accurate drug test to link the missing
drugs to the detectives. 253 "It would not be unreasonable to infer
that some amount of this [4,000 grams of] cocaine is still in exist-
ence, and has been used slowly over the last year and a half by these
officers, or, in the alternative, has been sold by them," asserted
Gentile.
254
248 The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination and the dep-
rivation of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend.
V.
249 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 209, §§ 10.3(b),(c).
250 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2727 (1991).
251 Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2736-37, 2739.
252 Motion to Compel Production of Hair Exemplars from Detective Steve Scholl,
Detective Louis Detiberiis, and Former Detective Edward Schaub (July 1988) (on file





The information, disclosed in the judicial proceedings de-
scribed above, is part of the public record, unless it is sealed by
court order. According to Supreme Court decisions, the court pro-
ceedings in which this information is discussed, are open to the pub-
lic. 255 The public and press may attend these proceedings; they may
listen to the information discussed between the witnesses, attorneys,
and judge; and they may publish or disseminate such information.
Yet, according to attorney no-comment rules, lawyers are prohib-
ited from discussing this same information outside of the court-
room. These rules do not alter the fact that this information is, in
fact, disseminated prior to trial; it merely alters the timing of such
dissemination, postponing it until it is discussed in open court,
rather than outside of court, where it risks prejudicing the jury.
Strong policy reasons exist for allowing the early release of this
information, many of which mirror the reasons given by the United
States Supreme Court in its decisions to allow public access to court
proceedings. First, the public has an inherent interest in maintain-
ing a check on the judicial system and its actors. Allowing lawyers to
comment on improper behavior by prosecutors, police officers, and
even judges increases public awareness and motivates societal ac-
tion. Justice Kennedy noted the important role attorneys play in
communicating with the public:
To the extent the press and the public rely upon attorneys for infor-
mation because attorneys are well-informed, this may prove the value
to the public of speech by members of the bar. If the dangers of their
speech arise from its persuasiveness, from their ability to explain judi-
cial proceedings, or from the likelihood the speech will be believed,
these are not the sort of dangers that can validate restrictions.
256
The Supreme Court also recognized that suppression of what may
be considered prejudicial information masks larger, societal issues
that may only be reformed through public awareness and access to
information.
[D]isclosure of the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of an in-
voluntary confession or the conduct of an illegal search... may be the
necessary predicate for a movement to reform police methods, pass
regulatory statutes, or remove judges who do not adequately oversee
law enforcement activity; publication of facts surrounding particular
plea-bargaining proceedings or the practice of plea bargaining gener-
ally may provoke substantial public concern as to the operations of the
judiciary or the fairness of prosecutorial decisions; reporting the de-
255 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Waller v. Geor-
gia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984); Press-Enterprise H, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
256 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2735 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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tails of the confession of one accused may reveal that it may implicate
others as well, and the .public may rightly demand to know what ac-
tions are being taken by law enforcement personnel to bring those
other individuals to justice; commentary on the fact that there is
strong evidence implicating a government official in criminal activity
goes to the very core of matters of public concern... ; dissemination
of the fact that indicted individuals who had been accused of similar
misdeeds in the past had not been prosecuted or had received only
mild sentences may generate crucial debate on the functioning of the
criminal justice system; revelation of the fact that despite apparently
overwhelming evidence of guilt, prosecutions were dropped or never
commenced against large campaign contributors or members of spe-
cial interest groups may indicate possible corruption among govern-
ment officials; and disclosure of the fact that a suspect has been
apprehended as the perpetrator of a heinous crime may be necessary
to calm community fears that the actual perpetrator is still at large.2 57
Attorney no-comment rules muzzle those individuals who are
often in the best position to create awareness. 258 Lawyers usually
have greater access to information than even the courts, where not
all evidence of interest to the public may surface. Because of their
unique access to information, attorneys may be seen as especially
authoritative or persuasive. 259 The trial process and the backlog of
cases that plague most courtrooms further delay public knowledge
of this misconduct, so that by the time it is brought to the public's
attention, the community's interest and energy may have waned or
been diverted.
In Gentile, defense counsel could not elaborate about his theory
that undercover detective Steve Scholl stole the drugs and money
missing from the vault. Gentile could not comment about his in-
dependent probe of Scholl,260 his knowledge that Scholl used co-
caine,26 1 or the reasons why the polygraph tests administered by
Ray Slaughter, the private detective who was later arrested and tried
257 Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 605-06.
258 See generally Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2735 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
259 Id. at 2733, 2735 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
260 "QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Have you conducted your own investiga-
tion of Detective Scholl and his role in this?
MR. GENTILE: Well, yes. The answer to this is yes. And I'm not-not only at
liberty to discuss that, George, but the fact is that I would be a pretty dumb lawyer if
I gave it up now, wouldn't I?"
Press Conference Re Grady Sanders by Dominic Gentile in Las Vegas, Nev. (Feb. 5,
1988).
261 Gentile said in the press conference that "[The police] were playing very fast and
loose.... We've got some videotapes that if you take a look at them, I'll tell you what,
[Detective Scholl] either had a hell of a cold or he should have seen a better doctor."
Gentie, 111 S. Ct. at 2739.
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on federal drug charges, could not be trusted.262 The police depart-
ment, headed by the popular Sheriff Moran, instituted a full-fledged
public relations campaign, which lauded the work of the two officers
and commended the police in their investigation. 263 For every neg-
ative or accusatory comment made about these officers or the police
force in general, a police spokesperson rebutted with assurances of
competence and the constant reminder that the officers in question
had passed polygraph tests. 264 And when Gentile held a press con-
ference to offset this adverse publicity, the police countered with its
own press conference. 265
The Gentile case demonstrates in a dramatic fashion that the
public does not benefit from the withholding of such important in-
formation until trial. By waiting until the appropriate court pro-
ceeding for evidence to publicly surface-especially information
that impacts directly on society-public confidence may erode and
community activism may ebb. This delay continues until such infor-
mation finally comes to light during a pretrial hearing or at the trial
itself.
Trial judges must determine the existence of probable cause, or
the guilt or innocence of a defendant. They are in no position to
investigate charges of police or prosecutorial conduct at that time.
More often, a public investigation must take place, which removes
the issue from the court and places it within a bureaucratic office.
Ironically, while no-comment rules prohibit attorneys from dis-
seminating "prejudicial" information through extrajudicial state-
ments, the later this information gets out through court
proceedings, the more likely it is to have the very same prejudicial
effect that judges fear will threaten a jury's impartiality. For in-
stance, Gentile intentionally held the press conference the day his
client was arraigned, knowing that, as a result of the six-month de-
lay, his statements would not prejudice his client's trial. 2 66 Had this
information come out closer to the trial date, the likelihood of taint-
ing the trial process would have substantially increased.
262 "QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Did the cops pass the polygraph?
MR. GENTILE: Well, I would like to give you a comment on that, except that
Ray Slaughter's trial is coming up and I don't want to get in the way of anybody
being able to defend themselves.
QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Do you think the Slaughter case-that
there's a connection?
MR. GENTILE: Absolutely. I don't think there is any question about it, and-"
Id. at 2732.
263 Tobin, supra note 222.
264 Koch, supra note 228.
265 Tobin & Bates, supra note 136; Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 100-03.
266 Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 44.
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The indiscriminate application of attorney no-comment rules
also unfairly burdens the defense. While these rules are intended to
apply to lawyers on both sides, in fact, the prosecution has a mouth-
piece that is not regulated: the police. Most information in state
criminal cases, as demonstrated in Gentile, comes from the police.
These law enforcement officers are not subject to the same rules by
which "officers of the court" must abide. As a result, police are free
to divulge prejudicial information to the public and press, which
benefits the public image and efforts of both the prosecutor, as well
as the police department. These efforts often lead to an arrest or
the filing of an indictment or information, which in itself may be a
presumption of probable guilt to some citizens.
Unable to counter this inference, the defendant must live with
this presumption until trial. During the pretrial and trial period, the
defendant cannot respond through defense counsel to the accusa-
tions in extrajudicial statements. In contrast, often acting as the
prosecution's mouthpiece, the police has free reign to disseminate
probative information about the case. Even if acquitted, a defend-
ant may not necessarily be vindicated in the public eye. A trial ver-
dict may be less widely and/or more obscurely publicized, than the
original accusation. 267 While Model Rule 3.6 seeks to preserve a
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial, in reality, the system
does not accomplish its goals.
VI. POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF ABOLISHING ATTORNEY NO-COMMENT
RULES
Attorney no-comment rules pose an unconstitutional limitation
on free speech and should be abolished. A world without attorney
no-comment rules, however, is not a world without standards on ex-
trajudicial speech. Attorney no-comment rules put the onus on law-
yers to curb their extrajudicial speech, and state disciplinary
commissions to discipline those lawyers who violate the rules. Abol-
ishment of no-comment rules shifts the burden back to the trial
courts, reverting to the system as it existed prior to the establish-
ment of these rules. The lower courts, having learned how to han-
dle high-profile cases, are equipped to monitor lawyers'
extrajudicial speech without the ambiguity of attorney no-comment
rules.
Rather than abolishing attorney no-comment rules, state
supreme courts could choose to modify their local disciplinary rules




in an attempt to eliminate the vagueness cited by the Supreme
Court in Gentile. To wit, the State Bar of Nevada is currently consid-
ering a modification of Rule 177, which states:
A lawyer shall not make any extrajudicial statement that would
reasonably be expected to be disseminated by means of public com-
munication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding; however, a lawyer may make a statement if the lawyer has
a good faith belief, based upon the totality of facts and circumstances
known to the lawyer at the time, that the content of the statement is
admissible at a subsequent hearing or trial or properly arguable from
anticipated evidence; and
(a) protects the public from substantial future harm; or
(b) protects the lawyer's client from substantial prejudicial pub-
licity not initiated by the lawyer or his client; or
(c) reveals governmental corruption or abuse of power.268
While these changes may facially clarify the rule, there is no
guarantee that they will be uniformly interpreted or lend themselves
to a consistent interpretation by lawyers, state disciplinary commis-
sions, or state supreme courts. Furthermore, state supreme courts
are too far removed from the fact-specific situations in which extra-
judicial speech violations are likely to occur. Their ability to gauge
such extrajudicial speech is further stymied by the fact that attorneys
often are not brought up on disciplinary charges until well after the
prejudicial information has been disseminated and the adjudicative
proceeding is over. In Gentile's case, more than six months elapsed
between the press conference and the complaint filed against Gen-
tile, charging him with violating Rule 177.269 And it was not until
February 1990 when the Supreme Court of Nevada ordered that
Gentile be privately reprimanded for his violation of Rule 177.270
Instead of encouraging state supreme courts to revise the disci-
plinary rule and monitor attorney conduct after-the-fact, judicial re-
view of lawyers' extrajudicial speech at the trial level would force the
courts to develop a consistent standard to control the dissemination
of prejudicial information so as not to create "a trap for the wary as
well as the unwary," '27 ' which currently exists in attorney no-com-
ment rules. Trial courts are more equipped than state supreme
courts, which typically oversee state disciplinary commissions, to
regulate such speech. After all, lower courts preside over adjudica-
268 Dominic P. Gentile, Proposed Revision to Supreme Court Rule 177, THE NEVADA LAw-
YER, Jan. 1993, at 7.
269 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 787 P.2d 386 (Nev. 1990).
270 Id.
271 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2732 (1991).
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tive proceedings, and they are in a better position to assess possible
prejudicial information and protect a defendant's right to a fair trial.
Rather than attempting to enforce ambiguous ethical and discipli-
nary rules, trial courts' may ease this conflict by establishing a con-
stitutional standard by which to impose trial-participant gag orders
and monitor attorneys' extrajudicial speech. The creation of such
guidelines will instruct both judges, who must enforce this standard,
as well as participants in extrajudicial speech, who must abide by
this standard or risk serious repercussions. While lower courts do
not have the power to censure, suspend, or disbar lawyers, they may
impose fines, hold lawyers in contempt of court, or refer them to the
state disciplinary board, the immediacy of which serves as an effec-
tive deterrent. Abolishment of attorney no-comment rules, there-
fore, allows trial courts to monitor lawyers' extrajudicial speech and
impose necessary sanctions.
It is possible that without formal disciplinary rules with which to
censure lawyers, courts may be tempted to respond to their fear of
unrestrained dissemination of prejudicial information by gagging
the media or closing courtrooms. Trial courts, however, are more
knowledgeable and experienced at handling high-profile cases than
they were twenty years ago. They now know, from Supreme Court
access-to-information rulings,272 that less invasive procedures, such
as change of venue, continuance; jury instructions and sequestra-
tion, and extensive voir dire, can and should be used to curb prejudi-
cial speech before imposing more severe measures, such as
courtroom closure or gag orders. Furthermore, First Amendment
jurisprudence 273 suggests that higher courts are apt to reverse gag
orders that are hastily imposed by trial courts. The Supreme Court
has emphasized that use of these tactics to suppress information are
an instrument of last resort. The Court has clearly stated that the
public's right of access to the courtroom prevails unless a higher
interest, such as a defendant's right to fair trial, is at risk.274 Only
when this higher interest is at stake may gag orders or courtroom
closure be issued, and even then, courts must narrowly craft these
procedures to specifically serve that higher interest.275
Even with this guidance from the Supreme Court, however, the
272 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Waller v. Geor-
gia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984); Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
273 The First Amendment access-to-information cases discussed herein require trial
courts to use less severe tactics before imposing a gag order. See supra part III.
274 See Richmond, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
275 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509-10.
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abolishment of attorney no-comment rules may cause judges to gag
trial participants, as opposed to the media. Judges may be inclined
to issue gag orders to ensure smooth trials, free from accusations
regarding prejudicial publicity due to extrajudicial speech. 276 They
may also gag trial participants to prevent criticism of judicial per-
formance in handling sensitive cases and protecting defendants'
Sixth Amendment rights. 277 The uncertainty and fear associated
with prejudicial publicity may also cause judges to prematurely cur-
tail trial-participant speech. Often, the decision to gag is made even
before the prejudicial impact of publicity can be accurately
assessed.2 7
8
An increase in trial-participant gag orders, however, is not nec-
essarily harmful. First, the practical effect of the Supreme Court's
access-to-information decisions, which allows lawyers to discuss po-
tentially prejudicial information inside the courtroom, often renders
moot the imposition of a gag order. Furthermore, any adverse reac-
tion to gag orders is likely to prompt a judicial review of gag orders
and attorneys' extrajudicial speech. Judicial review of trial-partici-
pant gag orders, resulting from the abolishment of attorney no-
comment rules, will lead to a more consistent standard by which to
monitor lawyers' extrajudicial speech. Attorney no-comment rules
have proven to be ineffective and ambiguous. A new approach is
needed.
VII. CONCLUSION
Attorney no-comment rules exist to prevent pretrial publicity
from tainting a jury and affecting a defendant's right to a fair trial.
The Supreme Court, however, in deciding Gentile, failed to reconcile
these rules with the principles established by the Court in the series
of access-to-information cases, which grant the public and media ac-
cess to courtroom proceedings and the right to disseminate infor-
mation discussed during such proceedings. The Court is unrealistic
276 See Robert F. Nagel, How Useful is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 302, 334 (1984), noting that "manyjudges exhibit extraordinary degrees of intoler-
ance every day in their courtrooms and virtually all of them exercise broad and abrupt
powers of suppression in discharging their duties."
277 See id. For an example of gag orders imposed in sensitive cases, see, e.g., In re T.R.,
556 N.E.2d 439 (Ohio 1990) (gag order upheld in child custody suit prone to media
attention); In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1988) (gag order imposed on
trial participants in Wedtech investigation, which charged military contractor with fraud-
ulently qualifying for federal contracts reserved for minority-owned companies); Radio
and Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Ct., 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) (gag
order upheld, prohibiting counsel from making extrajudicial statements to media about
certain subjects in espionage case).
278 Swartz, supra note 11, at 1432.
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if it believes that it can prevent the prejudicial impact of such infor-
mation by prohibiting lawyers from making extrajudicial comments,
when access to this very same information through open-court pro-
ceedings is constitutionally protected. If protecting defendants'
right to a fair trial cannot be achieved, and no other purpose can be
shown to satisfy the stringent standard required to restrain free
speech, then no-comment rules are but a meaningless limitation on
speech that run contrary to constitutional doctrine. Such limitations
are unconstitutional and should be abolished.
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